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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
ROBIN LANCE KAALOA, : Case No. 20050790-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defense counsel performed deficiently when he cross-examined the State's 
witness about three murders Kaaloa allegedly committed, allowed the State to admit 
crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposing 
body, and failed to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence or request a manslaughter 
instruction. Moreover, this Court should reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel 
because but for defense counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL 
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
This Court should reverse because defense counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness when he: (A) elicited testimony from Shelly Smith 
(Shelly) that Kaaloa had allegedly murdered three people; (B) allowed the State to admit 
crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposing 
body; and (C) failed to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence or request a 
manslaughter instruction. Moreover, this Court should reverse because but for defense 
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. See supra at Part D. 
A. Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness When He Cross-Examinecl Shelly On Three Murders 
Allegedly Committed By Kaaloa. 
As explained in Kaaloa's opening brief, the admission of prior bad acts evidence 
"tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process" and leads the finder of 
fact to convict on "an improper basis," such as a belief that the defendant has a bad 
character, likely acted in conformity with his bad character, and is therefore deserving of 
punishment. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988); see Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
Accordingly, it is unreasonable for defense counsel to affirmatively admit evidence of his 
client's prior crimes except, in rare instances, when the introduction of prior crimes 
evidence could "'produce a result favorable to the accused.'" Aplt. Br. at 22-23 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, 395 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. 1978)); see also State v. Cutcher, 
244 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969). 
The State does not challenge the accuracy of Kaaloa's statement of the law. Aple. 
Br. at 18. Instead, it argues Kaaloa's case is "inapposite" because, in Kaaloa's case, the 
"jury certainly understood" the alleged murders evidence was based on "hearsay and 
rumor, not fact," and defense counsel admitted the alleged murders evidence to show 
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Shelly had "a motive to lie," namely, she "was angry with" Kaaloa so she "spread 
baseless inculpatory rumors and hearsay about him." Aple. Br. at 18-19. 
The State's argument is based entirely on supposition and is not supported by the 
record. It is difficult to see how questioning Shelly about the three alleged murders 
would discredit Shelly rather than Kaaloa or why defense counsel would ever take such a 
chance. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. The alleged murders evidence was highly prejudicial because 
it accused Kaaloa of committing three murders very similar to the murder charged, 
thereby undermining his strong claim of self-defense. See id. at 25-27, 43-47. In 
comparison, Shelly's testimony that she heard Kaaloa make a potentially threatening 
comment was virtually harmless. IdL Plus, any harm it caused could not have been 
undone by discrediting her testimony alone. Because Barnes also testified he heard 
Kaaloa make a potentially threatening comment, defense counsel would have had to 
similarly discredit his testimony. R. 293:148-49. 
Regardless, according to the State, defense counsel's reason for admitting the 
alleged murders evidence was to discredit Shelly's testimony. Carrying out this supposed 
plan, defense counsel admitted detailed information about the three alleged murders 
without making any effort to discredit the evidence, contain the jury's consideration of it 
through a limiting instruction, or explain how it could possibly help the defense. See 
Aplt. Br. at 27-28, 46-47; R. 293-94. In other words, he let the alleged murders evidence 
stand unchallenged and available to the jury for general consideration on the merits. Id. 
By so doing, defense counsel did nothing to discredit Shelly's testimony. Id Instead, he 
conveyed the impression that the evidence supporting the alleged murders was so reliable 
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and Kaaloa "was so guilty, no defense was available." State v. Lamoreaux, 525 P.2d 
303, 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). Thus, it is irrelevant whether defense counsel had some 
unspoken strategic reason for admitting the alleged murders evidence because he acted 
deficiently by leaving the jury "in the dark about it." Cutcher, 244 N.E.2d at 769. 
It is also difficult to imagine a case in which the admission of highly prejudicial 
prior crimes evidence by defense counsel without any explanation as to why it was 
admitted would be considered effective assistance simply because the reason for 
admitting the prior crimes evidence might have been obvious to the jury despite the lack 
of guidance. Aple. Br. at 19. Even if such a case exists, this is not it. 
From the jury's perspective, the alleged murders evidence was very believable 
because it was completely uncontested. As explained previously, defense counsel 
seemed to concede the truth of the alleged murders evidence by eliciting it in detail, 
without challenging its reliability, limiting the scope of its admission, or explaining how 
it could possibly benefit Kaaloa's case. Aplt. Br. at 26-28, 46-47; R. 293-94. Moreover, 
Shelly, who knew Kaaloa and what he was capable of, and "[everybody" Shelly knew, 
believed Kaaloa had committed the alleged murders, R. 293:117-18 (Addendum A); 
Shelly said she had heard Kaaloa himself "bragging" about committing at least one of the 
alleged murders, R. 293:118; the State must have believed Kaaloa was capable of 
committing the alleged murders because it had charged him with a similar crime, R. 1-3; 
the State did not refute or clarify the alleged murders evidence, thereby implying it 
believed the evidence had been sufficiently covered by defense counsel, R. 293-94; and 
the judge admitted the alleged murders evidence despite an objection by the State and an 
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off-the-record discussion. R. 205-06; 293:118. As far as the jury knew, Kaaloa had 
already been tried and convicted of the alleged murders and defense counsel admitted the 
alleged murders evidence in an effort to "'steal the thunder' from the [State's] revelation" 
of the alleged murders. Sweitzer, 395 A.2d at 1383. In reality and as conceded by the 
State, however, the alleged murders evidence was comprised of "baseless inculpatory 
rumors and hearsay" that the State had no intention of attempting to produce at trial. 
Aple. Br. at 18. 
From the jury's perspective, the alleged murders evidence also had no connection 
to the question of whether Shelly had a motive to lie at trial. Linking the alleged murders 
evidence to Shelly's motives in testifying would have required the jury first to reject the 
credibility of the alleged murders evidence, despite the absence of evidence or argument 
refuting the allegations. R. 293-94. Second, to find Shelly knew the evidence was 
untrue, despite her testimony that she and u[e]verybody" she knew believed the murder 
allegations. R. 293:117-18. Third, to find Shelly was angry with Kaaloa because he 
bought the truck, even though she never said as much. Id at 112-19. Fourth, to find 
Shelly relayed the alleged murders information to the police in order to get Kaaloa in 
trouble, even though no evidence suggested this was true and Shelly's need for assistance 
1
 Shelly's passing statement that the alleged murders evidence was hearsay, did 
not diminish its believability. R. 293:117. Kaaloa was presented to the jury as a member 
of the "pretty strange" drug world. Id. at 35, 40-41. The jury did not understand that 
world, but Shelly did. Id. at 41; 294:103. Plus, Shelly knew Kaaloa personally, knew 
what actions he was capable of, and knew the people he spent his time with. Id. This 
background made Shelly's statements that she and "[ejverybody" she knew believed 
Kaaloa had murdered three other people and that she had actually heard Kaaloa 
"bragging" about one of the murders very believable. R. 293:117-18. 
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in recalling her statements to the police suggested she had no such motive. Id. at 117-18. 
Finally, to link these findings together and conclude that collectively this information 
somehow indicated Shelly had a motive to lie about the entirely separate incident for 
which the State called her to testify. Id at 112-19. To have reached this conclusion with 
guidance would have been a stretch, at the very least, but to have reached it in this case, 
with no guidance whatsoever, would have been impossible. R. 293-94. Thus, defense 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when he cross-
examined Shelly on the three murders allegedly committed by Kaaloa. 
B. Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness When He Failed to Object to the State's Admission of 
Evidence In Violation of Rule 403. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[Stipulation of fact by defense 
counsel does not make evidence less relevant, nor is it a basis for depriving the 
prosecution the opportunity of profiting from the 4 "legitimate moral force'" of its 
evidence in persuading a jury." State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,p7, 106 P.3d 734 
(citations omitted). "Notwithstanding this general rule," rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence excludes evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1989). In other 
words, even if the evidence at issue is relevant, "'the State is bound to stipulate to facts, 
to use an alternative mode of proof, or to forego introduction of the material if the 
evidence it offers cannot satisfy rule 403.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
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Under rule 403, the probative value of evidence is measured by "the prosecutorial 
need for the evidence." Florez, 777 P.2d at 456. Specifically, the "probative value" of 
evidence is significantly "limited" if it only corroborates "uncontested facts" or the 
credibility of a witness whose testimony is not "of great importance in the case and hotly 
contested by the parties." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87^40, 57 P.3d 220; see State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, |^53,52 P.3d 1210, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003); State v. Wells, 
603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979); State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968). 
In this case, Kaaloa's argument that defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by stipulating to the admission of the crime scene photographs and failing to 
object to the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposing body is based on 
rule 403. Consequently, Kaaloa's concession at trial that he killed Coates (albeit in self-
defense) and obstructed justice by abandoning the body on the side of the road is critical 
to this Court's analysis because, for rule 403 purposes, it significantly limited the 
probative value of the challenged evidence. See Calliham, 2002 UT 87 at (^40; Bluff, 
2002 UT 66 at ^53; Wells, 603 P.2d at 813; Poe, 441 P.2d at 515. 
As explained in Kaaloa's opening brief, the crime scene photographs and the 
medical examiner's testimony had very little, if any, probative value under rule 403 
because they corroborated only uncontested facts such as: Coates' identity, that Coates 
was dead, the cause of death, and the condition and location of Coates' body when it was 
discovered. Aplt. Br. at 31. They revealed little, if anything, about the actual issue 
before the jury: whether Kaaloa acted with the mens rea for murder or in self-defense. 
R. 294:8-10, 15-19; State's Exhibits 1 & 2, Further, even if they did reveal something 
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about Kaaloa's state of mind, the same could have been revealed through much less 
prejudicial evidence. See Florcz, 777 P.2d at 455 (holding '"State is bound to stipulate to 
facts, to use an alternative mode of proof, or to forego introduction of the material if the 
evidence it offers cannot satisfy rule 403.'" Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, for rule 
403 purposes, the crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's testimony had 
very little probative value because the main, if not sole, purpose for admitting the 
evidence was to inflame and arouse the jury by illustrating in graphic aural and visual 
detail the depravity with which Kaaloa treated the body after the altercation. Id, 
On the other hand, as explained in Kaaloa's opening brief, the crime scene 
photographs and the medical examiner's testimony created a great danger of unfair 
prejudice. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. The crime scene photographs were enlarged, color 
photographs of Coates' mostly naked, dirty, decomposing body as it was discovered— 
abandoned on the side of the road and unnaturally contorted against the jagged rock that 
stopped its slide down a steep, rocky slope. See State's Exhibits 1 & 2. And the medical 
examiner provided a graphic description of the decomposed state of Coates' body and the 
ways in which this necessitated disfiguring Coates' body during the autopsy. R. 294:8, 
10, 16-17. Individually and collectively, this evidence created a great danger of unfair 
prejudice that substantially outweighed what little, if any, probative value it offered. 
C Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness When He Failed to Move to Dismiss For Insufficient 
Evidence or Object to the Lack of a Manslaughter Jury Instruction. 
First, in conjunction with his argument that defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence, Kaaloa properly 
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marshaled the evidence supporting the murder conviction. Kaaloa was not required to 
include in the marshaled evidence his "testimony that he continued beating Coates in the 
head even after Coates was down." Aple. Br. at 29-30. A proper motion to dismiss 
would have been raised at the close of the State's case when the only evidence before the 
trial court for consideration would have been the evidence presented by the State. See 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,^40, 70 P.3d 111 ("CA defendant's motion to dismiss for 
insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court 
to determine whether the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his 
defense.'" (citations omitted); State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,^9, 988 P.2d 949 
(limiting review of sufficiency of evidence in "appeal focuse[d] on the denial of the 
motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief... to the evidence adduced by 
the prosecution in its case-in-chief '), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Instead, 
Kaaloa properly included in the marshaled evidence the medical examiner's testimony 
that the cause of death was "multiple blows" to the head and the fatal injury "could be" 
consistent with a metal bat and would have rendered Coates "unconscious." Aplt. Br. at 
36 (quoting R. 294:20-23). 
Kaaloa also properly included with Barnes' statement that he heard Kaaloa say, 
"The next time [Coates] takes a ride with me, he's not coming back," Barnes' follow-up 
statement that he believed Kaaloa "was joking." Aple. Br. at 30. Barnes' complete 
testimony was that he heard Kaaloa make a potentially threatening statement but believed 
Kaaloa was joking. R. 293:148-49. The jury was free to believe or disbelieve any part of 
this testimony, but Kaaloa, in marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict, was 
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required to place the complete testimony before this Court. See West Valley City v, 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding appellant must 
present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists" (emphasis 
omitted)). Anything less would have misrepresented the record. IdL 
Finally, Kaaloa properly included Barnes' testimony that Kaaloa claimed 
"Alfred's gang member friends killed Coates." Aple. Br. at 30. This evidence could 
have been interpreted by the jury as supporting the State's case. R. 293:140. In fact, it 
was the State that elicited this testimony from Barnes. Id. Thus, this Court should reach 
Kaaloa's argument that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to move to 
dismiss for insufficient evidence because Kaaloa properly marshaled the evidence 
supporting the murder conviction. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. 
Second, the State presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
murder. The evidence supporting a conviction for murder, as listed by the State, was: (1) 
prior to the altercation, Kaaloa made two statements that could have been interpreted as 
threats to kill Coates; (2) during the altercation, Kaaloa hit Coates in the head with a 
baseball bat up to four times, including after Coates had fallen to he ground; (3) after the 
altercation, Kaaloa went to the grocery store to purchase beer instead of attempting to 
resuscitate Coates or summon help; and (4) Kaaloa abandoned Coates' body on the side 
of the road. Aple. Br. at 19-20, 28. 
The remaining evidence presented at trial, as demonstrated by the marshaled 
evidence, showed Coates, while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, sought out 
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Kaaloa in order to confront him about the truck; Coates found Kaaloa relaxing and 
barefoot at home; Kaaloa and Coates fought; Coates had control of the machete before 
and during the fight; Kaaloa struck Coates with the bat approximately four times; and 
after the altercation, Kaaloa's apartment looked like a struggle had occurred and Kaaloa 
was limping and had a swollen left hand. R. 293-94; Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Taken as a 
whole, the evidence presented at trial strongly corroborated Kaaloa's claim of self-
defense and, at best, proved only manslaughter. The State itself apparently recognized 
this and argued only that Kaaloa was guilty because he killed Coates in a "fit of rage." R. 
293:38; 294:142-44, 156-58. Thus, defense counsel acted deficiently when he failed to 
move to dismiss for insufficient evidence. 
Third, defense counsel's failure, at the very least, to request a manslaughter 
instruction was not "' within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance'" 
because, under the circumstances of this case, "no conceivable legitimate tactic or 
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465, 
468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). The State surmises defense counsel's 
strategy was to "forego a manslaughter instruction in order to secure an acquittal for his 
client." Aple. Br. at 35. Even if the State's supposition is correct, however, defense 
counsel's performance was still deficient. 
The evidence presented at trial, if believed, was legally insufficient to prove 
murder, and, at best, proved only manslaughter. See Aplt. Br. at 41-43. The State 
apparently recognized this and argued Kaaloa was guilty because he killed Coates in a 
"fit of rage." R. 293:38; 294:142-44, 156-58. By failing to request a manslaughter jury 
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instruction, defense counsel did not make it any more likely the jury would acquit 
Kaaloa. See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983) (uTo expect a jury to . . . find 
a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond 
doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime requires of our juries clinical detachment 
from the reality of human experience." (citation omitted)). Instead, he virtually 
guaranteed a murder conviction, despite the lack of evidence, if the jury believed the 
State's argument that Kaaloa was guilty of some violent crime because the only other 
alternative was acquittal. SCQ id. ("Where one of the elements of the offense charged 
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to 
resolve its doubts in favor of conviction."). 
D. But For Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance, There Is a Reasonable 
Probability the Outcome of the Trial Would Have Been Different. 
The evidence supporting Kaaloa's conviction of murder was far from 
overwhelming. The only evidence supporting a conviction for murder, as listed by the 
State, was: (1) prior to the altercation, Kaaloa made two statements that could have been 
interpreted as threats to kill Coates; (2) during the altercation, Kaaloa hit Coates in the 
head with a baseball bat up to four times, including after Coates had fallen to he ground; 
(3) after the altercation, Kaaloa went to the grocery store to purchase beer instead of 
attempting to resuscitate Coates or summon help; and (4) Kaaloa abandoned Coates' 
body on the side of the road. Aple. Br. at 19-20, 28. 
The remaining evidence presented at trial showed Coates, while under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol, sought out Kaaloa in order to confront him about the 
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truck; Coates found Kaaloa relaxing and barefoot at home; Kaaloa and Coates fought; 
Coates had control of the machete before and during the fight; Kaaloa struck Coates with 
the bat approximately four times; after the altercation, Kaaloa5s apartment looked like a 
struggle had occurred and Kaaloa was limping and had a swollen left hand; and after the 
altercation, in addition to the seemingly irrational acts of shopping for beer and 
abandoning Coates' body on the side of the road, Kaaloa allowed people into his home 
while Coates' body was still present. R. 293-94. Taken as a whole, the evidence 
presented at trial strongly corroborated Kaaloa's claim of self-defense and, at best, 
proved only manslaughter. Aplt. Br. at 36-38, 48-49. The State itself apparently 
recognized this and argued only that Kaaloa was guilty because he killed Coates in a "fit 
of rage." R. 293:38; 294:142-44, 156-58. 
In light of the weak evidence supporting Kaaloa's conviction for murder, there is a 
reasonable likelihood the outcome of the trial would have been different but for defense 
counsel's admission of the alleged murders evidence, failure to object to the State's 
admission of the crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's description of 
Coates' decomposing body, and/or failure to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence or 
request a manslaughter instruction. See Aplt. Br. at 43-50 (explanation of prejudicial 
effect of defense counsel's deficient actions both individually and collectively). 
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CONCLUSION 
Kaaloa respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a 
new trial. 
SUBMITTED this _15_ day of August, 2006. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
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Office as indicated above this i/ day of August, 2006. 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
ROBIN 
OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS. ) 
LANCE KAALOA ) 
Defendant. ) 




BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 




JUNE 14, 2005 
By-
PILED DISTRICT G0URT 
thud Judicial District 
)C T 2 «• >005 
Deputy C!?rk 
ORlGiHAL 
REPORTED BY: Michelle B. Beatty, RPR, CSR'ITO 
_ (801) 238-7106 ... -pEO-Vr 
DOT 2 b :X5 
<rC4-~Z^ 
No further questions. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Any cross-examination, Mr. Chacon. 
MR. CHACON: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHACON: 
Q. Ms. Smith, do you recall being interviewed by agent 
Doug Miller on August 2004 regarding this particular case? 
A. We had quite a few interviews about this case. 
Q. This would have been the interview that took place at 
the Smith's grocery store at about 12th West and 600 North? 
A. Yeah, yeah I remember that one. 
Q. At that time had you smoked methamphetamine? Do you 
recall being under the influence of methamphetamine? 
A. That day, I donft remember. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall a conversation about 
Mr. Kaaloa supposedly having killed other people? 
A. That was hearsay to me. Urn, I heard that off and on. 
Q. And you mentioned that to the detective; correct? 
A. To tell you the truth, I don't remember if I said 
anything like that at all. 
Q. Let me give you a little background about the 
exchange between you and the detective and see if that 
refreshes your memory. 
A. Okay. 
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1 Q. It was about you indicating that supposedly there had 
2 been a murder right by the railroad tracks and the warehouse, 
3 and that they had got some drugs. 
4 And Detective Miller says, "Okay." 
5 And you responded: "And that was at another house. 
6 Then he was telling me, bragging, this is what I called it, 
7 somebody something that he had beat the shit out of, and they 
8 had buried someone by the railroad tracks and warehouse." 
9 MR. HARMS: Your Honor, I'm going to object before 
10 she answers and ask for a moment to discuss with Mr. Chacon 
11 something. 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
13 (Off-the-record discussion.) 
14 MR. HARMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 Q. (BY MR. CHACON) And then do you recall further 
16 conversation with Detective Miller about two other girls having 
17 been killed in Mr. Kaaloa's residence? 
18 A. That was something that I had heard, but I -- I may 
19 have mentioned it to him. 
20 Q. Okay. That presumably an Adrian and a Jennifer had 
21 been killed? 
22 A. Yeah. Everybody thought he had because they were 
23 missing, too. 
24 Q. And Jackie Allred told you that? 
25 I A. Yes, I remember that conversation. 















MR. CHACON: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further? 
MR. HARMS: No, Your Honor, may she be excused? 
THE COURT: Yes. Ms. Smith, you may step down, and 
you're free to go. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
MR. BURMESTER: Robert Barnes. 
ROBERT BARNES 
Called by the State, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
17 | THE WITNESS: I do. 
18 I THE COURT: You may be seated here, sir, 













Good afternoon, Robert. 
Good afternoon. 
Will you please give us your full name, 
your last name. 
and spell 
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